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ECISIONS by the Texas Supreme Court in the mandamus and
summary judgment areas raise important considerations for the ap-
pellate practitioner. A tension still exists among members of the
court regarding the appropriate role of mandamus relief in the discovery
area. On the one hand, the dissent in Chapa v. Garcia' charged the plurality
with micromanaging discovery by forcing the production of three or four
pages of material. On the other hand, the dissent in Remington Arms Co. v.
Caldwell 2 chided the majority for meddling with trial courts who find dis-
covery abuse and "possess the fortitude to utilize penalties against those who
thwart the objective of the discovery process-the search for truth."'3 Prac-
titioners should take note that frequently during the Survey period the court
found no adequate remedy by appeal from discovery orders.
Further, the court set out significant directives in McConnell v. Southside
Independent School District 4 for summary judgment procedure. A movant's
grounds for summary judgment must be expressly set out in the motion.5
Placing grounds for summary judgment in a brief is not sufficient. 6 More-
over, although a non-movant need not object to the deficiency of a motion if
the motion does not contain any or all grounds, the non-movant must object
if the motion is ambiguous or he waives the deficiency.
7
II. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
During the past five years, the number of mandamus actions reviewed by
the Texas Supreme Court has almost doubled over the number reviewed in
* B.S., University of Kansas; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D. cum laude, Southern
Methodist University, Attorney, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.G.S., University of Texas at Arlington; J.D. cum laude, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, Attorney, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 848 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
2. 850 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
3. Id. at 174.
4. 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993).




the preceding five years.8 A large number of the mandamus cases during the
last year occurred in the discovery area.9 The supreme court appears to be
dealing with the quandary of denying mandamus relief and forcing parties to
years of expensive litigation or granting relief on matters challenged by some
justices as adequately appealable after final judgment.' 0
1. Death Penalty Sanctions
Although during the last Survey period in Walker v. Packer" the Texas
Supreme Court set forth a more stringent approach to enforcing the "no
adequate remedy by appeal" requirement in granting mandamus relief, nu-
merous recent cases reinforce the court's decision in Transamerican Natural
Gas Corp. v. Powell. 12 In that case the court held that a party does not have
an adequate remedy at law when the trial court imposes death penalty sanc-
tions without the rendition of a final, appealable order.' 3 Specifically, the
court held in Transamerican, "Whenever a trial court imposes sanctions
which have the effect of adjudicating a dispute, whether by striking plead-
ings, dismissing an action or rendering a default judgment, but which do not
result in rendition of an appealable judgment, then the eventual remedy by
appeal is inadequate."' 14
In Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon 15 Chrysler sought a writ of mandamus to
vacate the trial court's order striking Chrysler's pleadings and rendering a
default judgment against Chrysler on all issues of liability. Chrysler argued
that the trial court's order violated the Transamerican standards. After ex-
tensive production and numerous hearings on discovery disputes between
the parties, the plaintiff complained that Chrysler acted in bad faith by refus-
ing to produce certain crash tests and a crash test index, an organizational
chart and information about Chrysler's document retention policies.
Chrysler responded that it had produced everything it was able to produce
and that many of the requests were for crash tests not relevant to the type of
crash involved in this case. For example, some of the crash test files re-
quested by the plaintiff dated back more than six model years and had been
destroyed pursuant to Chrysler's document retention policy, and numerous
requests involved rear-end impacts when this lawsuit concerned a frontal
impact. The trial court rejected Chrysler's position, struck its pleadings and
8. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84, 89
(Oct. 27, 1993) (orig. proceeding).
9. See id. at 88.
10. See id. at 87 & n.8, 88-89 (Phillips, C. J., dissenting); National Tank Co. v. Brother-
ton, 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding); Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d
179 (Tex. 1993); Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceed-
ing); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding); Chapa v.
Garcia, 848 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841
S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992)
(orig. proceeding) .
It. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
12. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
13. Id. at 919.
14. Id.
15. 841 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
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ordered the case to trial on damages alone; it also ordered that Chrysler
could not call expert witnesses regarding any aspect of liability at the trial on
the issue of damages.16
The supreme court held that discovery sanctions must be just and that two
factors mark the bounds of the trial court's discretion to impose sanctions:
"first, a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction
imposed must exist; and second, the sanction imposed must not be excessive.
In other words, 'the punishment should fit the crime.' "17 The supreme
court concluded that the trial court's sanctions failed the first test because
plaintiffs did not show they would be unable to prepare for trial without the
additional crash-test reports they sought and no evidence existed in the rec-
ord showing that the missing tests were within Chrysler's possession.18 The
court further held that the sanctions imposed failed the second test because
striking the pleadings and rendering a default judgment on liability was
more severe than necessary to satisfy the legitimate purposes of sanctions for
discovery abuse when the trial court did not first impose a lesser sanction. 19
According to the supreme court, death penalty sanctions should not be used
unless the trial court "finds that the sanctioned party's conduct 'justifies a
presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit' and that 'it would be
unjust to permit the party to present the substance of that position [which is
the subject of the withheld discovery] before the court.' "20 The Chrysler
record offered no such presumption. 21
Similarly, in Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee 22 the supreme court held that
the trial court's case-determinative discovery sanctions barring defendant
from introducing evidence supporting its defenses and entering judgment for
plaintiff did not meet the requirements of Transamerican.23 The Houston
Court of Appeals erroneously decided that without a statement of facts or
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court was presumed to have
made all findings necessary to support sanctions. 24 The supreme court em-
phasized that the trial court took no evidence but based its decision strictly
on the papers and arguments of counsel. 25 According to the supreme court,
the record did not reflect that the trial court considered the availability of
lesser sanctions to curb any abuse it found, and there was "nothing in the
16. Id. at 849.
17. Id. (quoting Transamerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917).
18. Id. at 849-50.
19. Id. at 850.
20. Id. (quoting Transamerican, 811 S.W.2d at 918).
21. The supreme court in Chrysler noted that the correct standard for reviewing a trial
court's order for sanctions is an "abuse of discretion" standard, not the legal and factual suffi-
ciency standard of review applicable to appeals of nonjury trials regardless whether the trial
court makes express findings of facts and conclusions of law in support of its sanctions order.
Chrysler, 841 S.W.2d at 852 (rejecting the San Antonio Court of Appeals' conclusion in Hart-
ford Accident & Ins. Co. v. Abascal, 831 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992,
orig. proceeding) that the legal presumptions in favor of a judgment following a nonjury trial
likewise applied to its review of the order for sanctions on mandamus).
22. 850 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1993).





record which even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for
the imposition of such sanctions." '26
A particularly arresting example of the imposition of the death penalty
occurred in Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell27 where the trial court allowed
trial to proceed to a jury verdict, then declared a mistrial, struck defendant
Remington's pleadings, partly for pre-trial discovery abuse, and rendered a
default judgment against Remington. The supreme court held that Reming-
ton could not properly be sanctioned for pretrial discovery abuse because the
plaintiff waived any objections to the incidents of pretrial misconduct cited
in the trial court's sanctions order by failing to request a pretrial hearing on
the alleged discovery abuse and by requesting a preferential trial setting.
28
The court further held that Transamerican standards did not justify death
penalty sanctions for failure to designate an expert witness, a single instance
of discovery abuse to which objection was made. 29 The court held that no
direct relationship existed between Remington's failure to designate a wit-
ness as a ballistics expert and the trial court's striking of Remington's plead-
ings, which act was "plainly excessive."' 30 The trial court accomplished the
legitimate purposes of discovery sanctions when it refused to allow Reming-
ton the benefit of the undisclosed ballistics testimony.
31
In GTE Communications Systems Corp. v. Tanner 32 the supreme court
reviewed the trial court's actions in striking defendant GTE's pleadings and
awarding the plaintiffs attorneys' fees for GTE's failure to produce a single
document that allegedly showed that GTE knew of the dangers inherent in a
sharp-edged metal cable. 33 According to the supreme court, the record did
not establish that GTE had "possession, custody or control" of the docu-
ment within the meaning of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(2)(b). Fur-
ther, even if the production of the document had been required, the supreme
court found the trial court's sanctions excessive. 34 "Case determinative
sanctions may be imposed in the first instance only in exceptional cases when
they are clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions
would promote compliance with the rules." 35
2. Mandamus Relief in Non-Death Penalty Discovery Matters
In a second Remington Arms case, Chapa v. Garcia,36 a plurality of the
supreme court conditionally granted a writ to vacate the trial court's order
26. Id.
27. 850 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
28. Id. at 170. The court did not hold that discovery sanctions could never be imposed
post-trial for pretrial discovery abuse. Discovery abuses may not be revealed until during or
after trial. Id.
29. Id. at 171. The plaintiff also complained of trial misconduct, which was not governed
by Rule 215 that applies only to pretrial conduct. Id.; see also TEX. R. COv. P. 215.
30. Remington Arms Co., 850 S.W.2d at 171.
31. Id.
32. 856 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
33. Id. at 726-27.
34. Id. at 729.
35. Id.
36. 848 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
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in a products liability action denying discovery of documents concerning de-
sign improvements of the Remington Model 700 rifle. The supreme court
held the trial court had abused its discretion by protecting some of Reming-
ton's documents from discovery. 37 The plaintiff asserting the right to dis-
covery of the documents was injured when a Model 700 rifle discharged as
he was loading it. The court decided that "because denial of these discovery
materials severely vitiates Relator's ability to present a viable claim at trial,
remedy by appeal is inadequate."'38 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Hecht,
joined by Justices Phillips, Gonzalez and Cornyn, observed that a grant of
mandamus to require the production of three or four pages when there is an
adequate remedy through ordinary appeal is an unfortunate example of the
supreme court's "micromanaging" discovery in the trial court.39
In Kennedy v. Eden 40 the supreme court held that the trial court abused
its discretion when it issued a broad order prohibiting a potential witness at
a deposition from attending the deposition, from conversing with anyone but
the attorney of record about the case, and from reading any report on the
testimony for an indefinite period of time.4' The supreme court held that
mandamus was appropriate because there was no adequate legal remedy
from such an order as the order restrained the visitor in his speech through-
out the duration of trial and appeal. 42 "The harm thus suffered could not be
repaired on appeal."'43
Public interest played an important role in the reversal of the trial court's
order in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Marshall," which directed defendant Eli Lilly, a
manufacturer of the drug Prozac, to produce the names of health care prov-
iders that had reported adverse reactions to the drug Prozac to Lilly.45
Lilly, as required under federal law, had turned the reports over to the Food
& Drug Administration (FDA). Federal regulations require the FDA to
keep confidential the names of the health care providers and patients in-
volved in such reports.46 The supreme court held that while the FDA regu-
lations did not preempt Texas discovery law, the trial court's order was
improper.47 The disclosure of otherwise discoverable information is cir-
cumscribed by the compelling public interest in confidential voluntary re-
porting that would be eviscerated by a manufacturer's compelled
disclosure. 48 In the supreme court's opinion, the trial court ordered full dis-
closure without according due consideration to the public interest in the vol-
37. Id. at 668.
38. Id. (quoting Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
39. Id. at 680 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
40. 837 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 98.
42. Id. at 98-99.
43. Id. at 99.
44. 850 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
45. Id. at 156.
46. The FDA filed a statement of interest in the proceeding at both the trial and appellate
level. Id. at 157 and n.5.





Protection of investigative reports was at issue in National Tank Co. v.
Brotherton.1° The trial court ordered defendant National Tank to disclose
reports containing statements of witnesses prepared by National Tank in
connection with its internal investigation of an explosion that killed one
worker and injured others. National Tank claimed that the documents had
been prepared in anticipation of litigation and were therefore protected. The
supreme court, in a plurality opinion, held that the trial court improperly
ordered disclosure. 5' The court noted that in Walker it concluded "that the
remedy by appeal is not adequate when the trial court erroneously orders
disclosure of privileged information which will materially affect the rights of
the aggrieved party." 52 The supreme court held that the information or-
dered disclosed by the trial court, which included statements of witnesses to
the explosion taken shortly after it occurred, "obviously could have a signifi-
cant impact on the assignment of liability," and thus, National Tank had no
adequate remedy by appeal. 53
3. Mandamus Relief Available Outside Discovery Context
a. Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration Under Federal
Arbitration Act
No right to an interlocutory appeal exists in state court from an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act;
the present method to obtain relief after denial of such motion is to seek a
writ of mandamus. 54 The supreme court acknowledged in Jack B. Anglin
Co. v. Tipps 55 that its ruling requires a party to pursue parallel proceed-
ings-an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial to compel arbitra-
tion under the Texas Arbitration Act 56 and a writ of mandamus from the
denial under the Federal Arbitration Act. 57 The court thus urged the legis-
lature to consider amending the Texas Act to permit interlocutory appeals of
49. Id.
50. 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
51. Id. at 207.
52. Id.
53. Id. The supreme court acknowledged in National Tank that its holding on this point
represents a modification of its own "investigative privilege" test set forth in Flores v. Fourth
Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Tex. 1989). National Tank, 851 S.W.2d at 203.
Specifically, in Flores, the supreme court held that the scope of the investigative privilege in-
cluded only investigative reports prepared "in anticipation of litigation," which meant "when
litigation is imminent." Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 41. In National Tank, the supreme court ex-
panded the investigative privilege to cover reports and documents prepared when the circum-
stances surrounding the investigation indicate to a reasonable person that a "substantial
chance of litigation" exists. National Tank, 851 S.W.2d at 204.
54. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
Both the Texas and Federal Arbitration Acts allow a party to appeal from an interlocutory
order granting or denying a request to compel arbitration, but federal procedure does not
apply in Texas courts, even when Texas courts apply the Federal Act. Id. at 27 1-72 and n. 10.
55. 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
56. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 238-2, § A(l) (Vernon 1973).
57. 842 S.W.2d at 272; see also International Bank of Commerce v. Caquias, 846 S.W.2d
496 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ (per curiam)).
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orders issued pursuant to the Federal Act.58 Until such a change occurs,
mandamus is appropriate from a denial of arbitration under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act because a party has no adequate remedy on appeal; he would
otherwise "be deprived of the benefits of the arbitration clause ... contracted
for and the purpose of providing a rapid, inexpensive alternative to tradi-
tional litigation would be defeated."' 59
b. Order Granting or Denying Motion to Transfer Venue
As a general rule, a trial court's order granting or denying a motion to
transfer venue may be adequately corrected on appeal and is not subject to a
mandamus action in the appellate court.60 Limited exceptions exist to this
general rule, however. When, for example, the trial court fails to follow the
procedural requirements of Rule 87 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
concerning each party's right to sufficient notice of the venue hearing, man-
damus lies. 61 Further, mandamus relief may be available in the context of a
mistaken transfer of venue.62 In HCA Health Services v. Salinas63 before
hearing a motion to transfer venue, the judge of the 288th District Court in
Bexar County mistakenly granted the motion by signing an order inadver-
tently included in a stack of papers presented to him. The Bexar County
deputy district clerk then transmitted the record to the Hidalgo County dis-
trict clerk, who docketed the case. The Bexar County judge signed a second
order vacating the order transferring venue immediately after the error came
to his attention. After a hearing, the judge denied the motion to transfer. In
the meantime, the Hidalgo County judge entered an order that the case had
been properly transferred and ordered the case to be prosecuted to final judg-.
ment in Hidalgo County.
The supreme court granted mandamus relief, holding that the Bexar
County judge timely and properly corrected its mistake by vacating the or-
der transferring venue. 64 Furthermore, the Hidalgo County judge abused
58. Anglin, 842 S.W.2d. at 272.
59. Id. at 272-73; see also Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 856 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (appropriate method to obtain relief after
denial of motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act is to seek a writ of
mandamus).
60. See '21' International Holdings, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec., 856 S.W.2d 479, 484
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ). In a significant Texas Supreme Court decision de-
cided during the Survey period, the supreme court held that the scope of appellate review of a
venue determination is not limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on
the motion to transfer but extends to whether the venue issue was in fact properly decided
based upon the entire record in the trial court. See Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752
(Tex. 1993). If, based on the entire record, including trial on the merits, there is no evidence of
proper venue, the error cannot be harmless and the case must be remanded either for transfer
to the court where venue lies or for further proceedings on the venue issue. Id.
61. Mauro v. Banales, 858 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig. pro-
ceeding) (citing Henderson v. O'Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)).
62. Id.
63. 838 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
64. Id. at 248. The order transferring venue was interlocutory as to the parties but final as
to the transferring court, which had plenary jurisdiction for thirty days to correct the order,
which was done. Id.
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his discretion in ordering the parties to proceed in Hidalgo County.65 Man-
damus was proper because of the resulting deadlock in the litigation that left
no adequate remedy by appeal from the conflicting orders.66
c. Order Denying Special Appearance
The majority of the intermediate appellate courts hold that mandamus
relief is not available from an order overruling a special appearance. The El
Paso Court of Appeals recently adopted this position in National Industrial
Sand Association v. Gibson67 following the Dallas Court of Appeals decision
in N.H. Helicopters, Inc. v. Brown.68 Both the El Paso Court of Appeals in
Gibson and the Eastland Court of Appeals in A ktienggesellschaft v. Kirk 69
expressly declined to follow the Amarillo Court of Appeals' contrary conclu-
sion in Laykin v. McFall.70
d. Order Overruling Plea to Jurisdiction
The Austin Court of Appeals in Brown v. Herman7' recently concluded
that mandamus is inappropriate to challenge an order overruling a plea to
the jurisdiction, declining to follow the contrary holding in Qwest Micro-
wave, Inc. v. Bedard 72 because questions of jurisdiction can be challenged on
appeal.
e. Order Overruling Motion to Sever Claims
Mandamus relief is available from an order overruling a motion to sever
when the trial court's failure to sever will cause the loss of substantial rights,
as it did in FA. Richard and Associates v. Millard.73 In Millard, the court
held there was no adequate remedy by appeal when the trial court refused to
sever a bad faith claim against the insurance company and the insurance
adjuster from plaintiff's tort action against the driver of the car in the acci-
dent at issue.74 The party's rights not to have their respective defenses
prejudiced by evidence about insurance and settlement could only be pro-
tected by severance and abatement, therefore warranting a writ of manda-
mus compelling these protections. 75
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 855 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, orig. proceeding).
68. 841 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
69. 859 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, orig. proceeding). The court listed com-
pelling factors, such as protecting the rights of children and parents in family matters, that
may justify mandamus relief. Id. at 653.
70. 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, orig. proceeding).
71. 852 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, orig. proceeding).
72. 756 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, orig. proceeding).
73. 856 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding); see also
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
orig. proceeding) (no adequate remedy by appeal if only severance or separate trials will avoid
prejudice and limiting instructions used as means to prevent prejudice against one party will
not eliminate prejudice).
74. 856 S.W.2d at 767.
75. Id.
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f. Refusal to Fix Amount of Supersedeas Bonds
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide a method to re-
view a trial court's order refusing to allow appellant to file a supersedeas
bond.76 Thus, the trial court may be compelled by writ of mandamus to fix
the amount of a supersedeas bond as it was in Vineyard v. Irving. 77 This is a
clear example of the stated principle that mandamus lies only to correct a
clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when that
abuse cannot be remedied by appeal.
g. Order Overruling Motion to Recuse
A litigant may petition for writ of mandamus to compel a retired judge to
accept the litigants' timely objection and remove himself from the case. 78 A
motion to recuse is timely filed if filed at least ten days before the date set for
trial, 79 but a party waives recusal if he does not raise the issue by proper
motion.80 In contrast, a motion to disqualify a judge "survives silence" -
disqualification may be raised at any time.8' In fact, disqualification may be
introduced for the first time in a collateral attack on the judgment, and
either a trial or appellate court may raise the issue of disqualification on its
own motion.8 2
h. Order Sustaining Motion to Quash Execution
An order sustaining a motion to quash execution is not a final, appealable
judgment, 83 and a trial court's disposition of a motion to quash a writ of
execution is not in the nature of an appealable mandatory injunction. 84
Mandamus will thus lie to compel a trial court to aid a judgment creditor to
obtain satisfaction of a judgment rendered in that court. 85
i. Appellate Court's Refusal to Accept Electronic Statement of Facts
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when an appellate court abuses its
discretion by refusing to accept a party's untimely filed electronic statement
of facts if the party has a reasonable explanation for its delay.8 6 In National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Ninth Court of Appeals,8 7 the party's "reasonable
76. Vineyard v. Irving, 855 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig.
proceeding).
77. Id. at 209.
78. Discovery Operating, Inc. v. Baskin, 855 S.W.2d 884, 888 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
orig. proceeding).
79. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a).
80. Gulf Maritime Warehouse Co. v. Towers, 858 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1993, writ requested).
81. Id. at 560.
82. Id.
83. Gonzales v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig.
proceedings).
84. Id. at 256.
85. Id.
86. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84 (Oct.




explanation" was its mistake as to its obligations under Liberty County's
special rules for electronic recordings."8 Under these circumstances, the ap-
pellant had no adequate remedy by appeal because the party's appeal, with-
out the statement of facts, "is a clear, and useless waste of judicial
resources."89
j. Trial Court's Refusal to Comply with Supreme Court Mandate
If a trial court fails to issue a judgment in accordance with a supreme
court mandate, the aggrieved party may seek either a writ of prohibition or a
writ of mandamus to ensure compliance with the supreme court's judg-
ment.90 The trial court's refusal to conform to the supreme court directive
in itself is an abuse of discretion. 9 1
k. Order Granting Temporary Visitation
In Little v. Daggett,92 a paternity suit, the Texas Supreme Court held that
since a temporary order granting out-of-state visitation rights is not appeala-
ble, mandamus relief is available upon the determination that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the temporary rights when it had no juris-
diction to do so. 9 3 In so holding, the supreme court acknowledged that ordi-
narily mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for errors in subject matter
jurisdiction because appeal is an adequate remedy. 94 Had the case involved
a permanent order, mandamus would not lie.9 5
1. Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Counsel
The supreme court held in Mauze v. Curry 96 that mandamus will lie from
a trial court's abuse of discretion in denying a motion to disqualify counsel
when counsel testifies as an expert witness in a controverting affidavit re-
sponding to a motion for summary judgment and the testimony does not fall
into any of the five exceptions to Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.08(a). 9 7 Rule 3.08(a) prohibits a lawyer from continuing employ-
88. Id. at 86.
89. Id. at 87 n.8.
90. Lee v. Downey, 842 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
91. Id.
92. 858 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
93. Id. at 369.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1265 (Sept. 10, 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
97. TEX. R. DIscIPLINARY P. art. X, § 9, Rule 308 (1990) (repealed effective May 1,
1992, except to the extent that it applies to then pending disciplinary matters by order of the
Supreme Court of Texas).
The five exceptions occur when:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony will relate solely to a
matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in
opposition to the testimony; (3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; (4) the lawyer is a party to the action and is appearing pro se; or (5) the
lawyer has promptly notified opposing counsel that the lawyer expects to testify in the matter
and disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Id.
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ment in a proceeding if he knows or believes he is or may be a witness neces-
sary to establish an essential fact on behalf of his client.98
m. Order Referring All Discovery Matters to a Master
A writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy from a trial court's blanket
order appointing a master and referring all pending and future discovery
matters to the master.99 In Academy of Model Aeronautics, Inc. v. Packer 100
the trial court appointed a special master, upon a motion, to hear all pending
and future discovery matters. At the time the motion was heard, there were
four pending discovery motions; a fifth discovery motion had been heard by
a visiting judge. The supreme court held that pursuant to Rule 122 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure the trial judge had abused her discretion
by entering a blanket order referring all pending and future discovery mat-
ters to the master.' 0 '
n. Order Sustaining Contest of Pauper's Affidavit
Mandamus will issue when a trial court sustains a contest to an applica-
tion for an affidavit of inability to pay the costs of appeal after the expiration
of the 10-day period allowed by Rule 40(a)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. The court in Lovall v. West 102 emphasized that ten days
after the application for the affidavit is filed, the allegations in the affidavit
are taken as true and any later contest is untimely. 0 3
o. Rule 215(5) Order Excluding Witnesses
Under the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Specia,'04 mandamus relief is available when the trial court refuses to va-
cate a rule 215(5) discovery sanction order excluding a plaintiff's witnesses
after the plaintiff takes a nonsuit and refiles a subsequent suit against the
same defendant. 105 In Specia, the plaintiff failed to designate several expert
and fact witnesses resulting in the trial court's granting of the defendant's
motion to exclude the witnesses.' 0 6 The plaintiff nonsuited and refiled a sec-
ond lawsuit against the same defendant. In the second lawsuit, the defend-
ant filed a motion to enforce the sanctions from the previous lawsuit and the
trial court granted the motion and precluded the plaintiff from presenting
the witnesses at trial. 107
In the plaintiff's mandamus proceeding, the supreme court noted that
98. Id.
99. Academy of Model Aeronautics, Inc. v. Packer, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1266 (Sept. 10,
1993) (orig. proceeding).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1267.
102. 859 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 545.
104. 849 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
105. Id. at 807-08.




whether a discovery sanction survives a nonsuit depends upon the nature of
the sanction involved. '08 "If," the court held "a sanction is aimed at insur-
ing a party is given a fair trial and not subjected to trial by ambush, the
reason for imposing the sanction no longer exists after a party takes a non-
suit" and thereby postpones the trial. ' 09 In such a case, the court concluded,
the sanctions do not survive a nonsuit and mandamus relief is available to
compel the trial court to vacate the sanctions order from the previous
lawsuit. 110
4. Mandamus Relief Must Be Expeditiously Sought
While mandamus relief may appear to be available in a number of circum-
stances, the Texas Supreme Court recently held in Rivercenter Associates v.
RiveraI "that such relief is not available to help those who do not diligently
pursue their rights.12 Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its
issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles." 3 One such principle
"is that [e]quity aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their
rights." 4 In Rivercenter, the defendant filed a jury demand and, over four
months later, the plaintiff filed a motion to quash the jury demand based on
jury waiver provisions in the contracts in dispute.' '5 The trial court, after
hearing and review of the contracts, overruled Rivercenter's motion to
quash. The supreme court held that under the circumstances of
Rivercenter's unexcused delay in asserting its rights under the jury waiver
provisions, Rivercenter had not shown "diligent pursuit" of any right to a
non-jury trial. As a result, the court held, Rivercenter was not entitled to
mandamus relief." 16
5. Writs of Prohibition
In a per curiam opinion in Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board
v. City of Irving, " 7 the Texas Supreme Court remanded a zoning case to the
trial court for consideration of the effect of new legislation on the case and
specifically ordered the trial court to consider the applicability, validity and
constitutionality of the new statute. Before the remand, a Tarrant county
trial court had enjoined certain parties to the Dallas suit from contesting the
constitutionality of the new legislation. On remand of the case to the Dallas
108. Id. at n.3.
109. Id. at 806-07.
110. Id. at 807. As evidenced by this case and others, the Texas Supreme Court appears to
favor a flexible application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(5). See also H.B. Zachry Co.
v. Gonzales, 847 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief available to set
aside trial court's order excluding witnesses under rule 215(5) when trial setting was continued
more than thirty days from date of trial from which witnesses had been excluded).
Ill. 858 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
112. Id. at 367.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Callahan v. Giles, 155 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1941) (orig. proceeding)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 367-68.
117. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 89 (Oct. 27, 1993) (per curiam).
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court, the Tarrant county trial court refused to modify this order. One of
the parties filed an ancillary petition for writ of prohibition with the supreme
court. The supreme court conditionally granted writ, holding that the trial
court's order interfered with the supreme court's jurisdiction over the re-
manded matter." 8 The court held that once the supreme court has re-
manded a cause to a lower court, the supreme court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the remanded proceeding and will permit no interference
from any other court." 19 The supreme court granted a writ of prohibition
directing the Tarrant County trial court to delete its injunctive orders and
issue no other orders that would interfere with the supreme court's
jurisdiction. 120
The proper remedy to seek if a visiting judge continues to act in a case
without proper assignment may be an application for writ of prohibition
preventing the judge from taking any further action. 12 1 A retired visiting
judge who is not qualified to serve is without authority to act in the cases to
which the judge is assigned, and the judge's orders entered in connection
with the assigned cases are, therefore, void.' 22 Under these circumstances,
the El Paso Court of Appeals held in Houston General Insurance Co. v.
Ater 123 that mandamus, as opposed to a writ of prohibition, is not the proper
remedy.
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Sections 51.012 and 51.014(4) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code permit appellate review of an interlocutory order that grants a tempo-
rary injunction. Determining what constitutes a temporary injunction is the
essential inquiry. The supreme court in Del Valle Independent School Dis-
trict v. Lopez 124 held that a trial court's order that provided mandatory, tem-
porary relief by implementing an interim election plan pending the final
resolution of the case granted "injunctive" relief despite the fact that it was
not issued in accordance with Section 65.022 of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code.125 The court rejected the notion that "such matters of form
control the nature of the order itself-it is the character and function of an
order that determine its classification."' 126
Because an appeal of an order granting or denying a temporary injunction
is an appeal from an interlocutory order, the merits of the movant's case are
118. Id. at 90.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ater, 843 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, orig.
proceeding).
122. Id. at 227.
123. Id. at 229.
124. 845 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1992).
125. Id. at 809. In a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Del Valle ISD
board election system, the trial court entered an "Order Adopting and Implementing Interim




not presented for appellate review. 127 The courts held in Car Wash Systems,
Inc. v. Brigance128 and Metcalfe v. Walling129 that the trial court's scope of
review is strictly limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.
III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A. CHARGE ERROR
The Texas Supreme Court in State Department of Highways & Public
Transportation v. Payne130 attempted to alleviate some of the complexity of
the current method for charge error preservation when it stated:
There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved
error in the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial
court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling.
The more specific requirements of the rules should be applied, while
they remain, to serve rather than defeat this principle. 131
The supreme court continues to make efforts to limit decisions based strictly
on the technicalities of charge procedure. In Payne it pointed out that it has
asked a special task force to recommend changes in the rules to simplify
charge procedures. The court observed that any rules changes must await
the completion of that process, however, because the supreme court does not
revise rules by opinion.' 32 Nonetheless, the court noted it could "begin to
reduce the complexity that caselaw has contributed to charge
procedures." 133
1. Instructions to the Jury
Following the principles stated in Payne, the supreme court in Spencer v.
Eagle Star Insurance Co. 134 stated that an objection to a defective instruc-
tion without submission of an alternative is sufficient to preserve error for
appellate review. Rule 278 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which
127. Car Wash Sys., Inc. v. Brigance, 856 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1993, no
writ).
128. Id. at 857.
129. 856 S.W.2d 580 (Tex, App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 37 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 18 (Oct. 6, 1993).
130. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
131. Id. at 241. Despite this attempt, some courts of appeal emphasize that the test set
forth in Payne is merely dicta and continue to insist that parties strictly comply with the letter
of Rules 271-279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, no matter how complex and intricate
the rules may be. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Borden, Inc. v. Rios, 850 S.W.2d
821, 827 n.3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), judgment set aside per settlement, 859 S.W.2d 70
(Tex. 1993), decided to attempt to examine the question of preservation in light of both Rule
274 and the Payne test, although it noted that application of the Payne test is much more
problematic than application of Rule 274. The court in Borden pointed out that the Payne test
requires the court of appeals to determine whether "the party made the trial court aware of the
complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling," but the test does not tell how to measure
awareness or plainness of the complaint. Id. (quoting Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 241).
132. 838 S.W.2d at 241.
133. Id. at 870-71.
134. 1994 WL 37481 at *2 (Tex. Feb. 9, 1994). The court withdrew the original opinion in
Spencer, published at 860 S.W.2d 868, issued a new opinion and denied the motion for
rehearing.
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states in pertinent part: "Failure to submit a definition or instruction shall
not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially
correct definition or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered
by the party complaining of the judgment," does not apply to a party ob-
jecting to a defective instruction. 135 Rather, the rule applicable to defective
instructions is rule 274 of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in
part: "A party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the objection-
able matter and the grounds of the objection. Any complaint as to a ques-
tion, definition, or instruction, on account of any defect, omission or fault in
pleading, is waived unless specifically included in the objections."1 36 The
court held an objection alone is sufficient to preserve error in a defective
instruction, and a request, of substantially correct language is not
required. 137
While a proper objection to the charge will preserve error as to a defective
instruction, it will not preserve error as to an omitted instruction. In Lopez
v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 138 the court held that the plaintiff
waived any error in the trial court's refusal to include an instruction on an
evidentiary presumption because the plaintiff failed to request and tender, in
writing, a proposed instruction in substantially correct form.139
A trial court's refusal to include a substantially correct instruction on an
issue central to the parties' entire dispute constitutes reversible error. 140 In
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. John Carlo Texas, Inc. 14, the plain-
tiff/contractor alleged that Southwestern Bell intentionally interfered with
its contract with the city of Houston to widen a road. The central dispute at
trial was whether Southwestern Bell's interference with the contract was jus-
tified. The trial court refused Southwestern Bell's substantially correct re-
quest to define "justification" for the jury, and the supreme court held that
such refusal was reversible error under the circumstances of this case. 142
Following Payne's directive, the court of appeals in Oechsner v. Ameritrust
Texas, N.A. 143 held that despite the appellant's failure to get the trial court's
signature on a requested instruction and failure to have the trial court en-
dorse the instruction as "refused" or "modified" as required by Rule 276,
the appellant preserved its charge error.'" The record clearly demonstrated
that the instruction was timely presented.' 45 Furthermore, opposing counsel
knew it was before the trial court and the trial court clearly refused to sub-
135. Id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
136. Spencer, 1994 WL 37481 at *3; TEx. R. Civ. P. 274.
137. Spencer, 1994 WL 37481 at *3. Justice Doggett in dissent opined that Eagle Star did
not properly object to the instruction because it merely cross-referenced an objection to the
related question. Id. (Doggett, J., dissenting). Practitioners are well-advised to make specific
objections to both question and instruction.
138. 847 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
139. Id. at 332-33.
140. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Tex., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1992).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 840 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).





2 Submission of Questions
The supreme court held in H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner 147 that the
trial court's failure to submit a tendered proper broad-form question with
appropriate instructions was error but not harmful error.148 While the court
noted that Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates broad-
form submissions whenever they are "feasible,"'149 it found that the granu-
lated form of submission contained the proper elements of a premises liabil-
ity action.' 50 The court held that when the charge fairly submits to the jury
the disputed issues of fact and incorporates a correct legal standard for the
jury to apply, the trial court's refusal to submit a proper broad-form ques-
tion with instructions is not reversible error.' 5' Justice Mauzy argued in
dissent that the granulated questions improperly restricted the scope of the
determination of the store's knowledge of the hazard, which, in his opinion,
effectively prevented the plaintiff from prevailing on her claim.15 2
In Mexico's Industries, Inc. v. Banco Mexico Somex, S.N.C, 5 3 the court
held that a trial court has great discretion in submitting broad form jury
questions.' 54 "This discretion," the court continued, "is subject only to the
requirement that the questions submitted must control the disposition of the
case being raised by the pleadings and evidence and properly submit the
disputed issues for the jury's determination."' 55 As a result, because the
plaintiff failed to plead ratification affirmatively, the trial court erred in sub-
mitting a question on that issue. 156
To preserve error for a trial court's refusal to submit a question to the
jury, a party must submit the question in writing and obtain a ruling on the
request.' 57 The trial court's overruling a party's objections to the jury
charge does not constitute a ruling on the request under Rules 276 and 279
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.15 8
3. Objections to Damages
An appellant's failure to complain of the possibility of a double recovery
in its objections to the charge or in its motion for new trial waives his com-
plaint that the trial court's award of damages for lost profits constitutes a
146. Id.
147. 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1992).
148. Id. at 260.
149. Id. at 259-60.
150. Id. at 260.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 262 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
153. 858 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ requested).
154. Id. at 582 (citing Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Tex. 1974)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. TEX. R. Civ. P. 276 and 279.
158. Satterwhite v. Safeco Land Title, 853 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ
denied). Cf Oechsner v. Ameritrust, 840 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
For discussion, see supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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double recovery.' 59 The Dallas court pointed out in D/FW Commercial
Roofing Co. v. Mehra' 6° that Rule 52(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires that "a party must have presented to the trial court a
timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the rul-
ing he desired the court to make, if the specific grounds were not apparent
from the context" in order to preserve appellate complaints. 16 1 In Mehra,
because the appellant failed to complain of a double recovery both at trial
and in its motion for a new trial and merely asserted insufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury's damage award, he did not preserve the issue of
double recovery for appellate review.162
B. CHALLENGES TO THE JUDGMENT
A party does not waive his alternative grounds for denying recovery by
failure to object to the judgment in the trial court that does not specifically
state those grounds. 163 In Oak Park Townhouses v. Brazosport Bank, N.A.,
the bank sued the borrowers on a note and the jury returned answers against
the bank on several grounds, including mutual mistake, economic duress,
breach of contract, and fraud. The trial court rendered judgment against the
bank based on usury and awarded damages based on usury and breach of
fiduciary duty. 16, The judgment incorporated the jury's verdict "for all pur-
poses," but it did not refer to the alternative grounds for denying the bank
recovery.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment based on usury
and breach of fiduciary duty and allowed the bank to recover on the note.' 65
In a motion for rehearing, the borrowers argued that the court of appeals
should render judgment based on their other grounds for denying recovery.
The supreme court held that the court of appeals erred in allowing the bank
to recover without first considering the alternative grounds for denying re-
covery raised in the borrowers' motion for rehearing. 66 The court con-
cluded that the borrowers did not waive the alternative grounds by failing to
object to the judgment in the trial court.' 67
IV. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
A. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Scott 168 the supreme court held: "The
159. D/FW Commercial Roofing Co. v. Mehra, 854 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993,
no writ).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 189.
162. Id.




166. Id. at 190-91.
167. Id. at 190.
168. 846 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
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filing of a motion for new trial in order to extend the appellate timetable is a
matter of right, whether or not there is any sound or reasonable basis for the
conclusion that a further motion is necessary."' 69 In Old Republic the trial
court signed a default judgment on February 1, 1990. The defendant timely
filed a motion for new trial, and on April 16, 1990, the trial court granted, in
part, the motion for new trial, set aside the damages finding and granted a
hearing on plaintiff's damages. Then, on May 14, 1990, the trial court set
aside the April 16, 1990, order, effectively reinstating the original defaultjudgment. On June 8, 1990, the defendant filed a second motion for new
trial, which the trial court purported to strike by order dated July 17, 1990.
The defendant filed its appeal bond on August 9, 1990. The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because it found the appeal
bond had not been timely filed. 170
The supreme court reversed. It held that the May 14, 1990, order oper-
ated as an order modifying, correcting or reforming the original default
judgment and that the appellate timetable began anew from that date.' 7'
The defendant's motion for new trial, timely filed on June 8, 1990, extended
the time for filing the appeal bond for 90 days from May 14, 1990 (the date
the modified judgment was signed), or until August 12, 1990. As a result,
the supreme court held the defendant's appeal bond was timely filed on Au-
gust 9, 1990, and dismissal by the court of appeals was improper. 172 The
supreme court further noted that the trial court's July 17, 1990, order pur-
porting to strike the defendant's June 8, 1990, motion for new trial was a
nullity. 173
If a motion for severance is granted and the party's severed claims are
dismissed but the clerk of the appellate court fails to assign a new number
promptly to the severed cause, a party may file a motion for new trial under
the original cause number. 174 The Texas Supreme Court in McRoberts v.
Ryals' 75 held that a party should not be punished for failing to file a motion
for new trial timely in the severed cause when he faces the impossible di-
lemma of having to file his motion for new trial under a nonexistent cause
number.' 76 The court therefore concluded that the appellant's motion for
new trial filed under the original cause number, which was the same cause
number on the judgment sought to be appealed, was effective to extend the
timetable for appeal, causing his original appeal to be timely and free from
any non-curable defects.' 77
169. Id. at 833.
170. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 834 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992), rev'd, 846
S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
171. Scott, 846 S.W.2d at 832.
172. Id. at 833-34.
173. Id. at 833. Whenever a court modifies its original judgment in any way, practitioners
should seek a revised judgment that clearly states it modifies, corrects or reforms the earlierjudgment so a second motion for new trial will extend the appellate timetable. See generally
Scott, 834 S.W.2d 832. See also TEX. R. APP. P. 41.
174. McRoberts v. Ryals, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1093 (June 30, 1993).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1097 (citing Mueller v. Saravia, 826 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1992)).
177. Id. The court continues to recognize bona fide attempts to appeal.
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Under the supreme court's ruling in Levit v. Adams 178 the provisions of
Rule 306a(4) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing additional time
for filing various post-judgment pleadings when a party does not receive no-
tice or acquire actual knowledge within twenty days after a judgment is
signed, do not apply if more than ninety days has passed after the judgment
is signed.179 The supreme court clarified in Levit that the period for filing a
motion to reinstate after dismissal under Rule 306a(4) shall in no event begin
to run more than ninety days after the dismissal is signed.180 In Levit, the
supreme court resolved the disagreement among the courts of appeals over
the application of Rule 306a(4) when a party learns of judgment or dismissal
between the 90th and 120th days after the judgment or order was signed.
The supreme court observed that its holding would allow a party not receiv-
ing timely notice a full thirty days to file a motion to reinstate if he learns of
dismissal before ninety days have elapsed.181 If more than ninety days have
elapsed, a party must seek a bill of review, as in Levit.182
A party's complaints in her motion for new trial must provide the trial
court an opportunity to cure any errors by granting a new trial. 183 To pro-
vide such an opportunity, the allegations in the motion for new trial, in ac-
cordance with Rule 321 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, must be
sufficiently specific to enable the trial court to understand clearly what is
being alleged as error. 184
When an unchallenged "no damages" finding supports a take-nothing
judgment, any error in the liability findings is harmless. 185 In San Antonio
Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery'86 the plaintiff did not attack in any
way the jury's finding of no damages. Rather, the points of error challenged
only the jury's resolving the liability issues against the plaintiff. The plaintiff
failed to challenge the no-damage finding in its motion for new trial as re-
quired by Rule 329b and therefore failed to preserve error. The court held
that the unchallenged no-damage finding supported the judgment regardless
of any error in the liability findings. 187 Even if the jury had found liability,
the no-damage finding would have resulted in a take-nothing judgment un-
less it was successfully challenged, for example, as against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. 188
178. 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 470.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The trial court in Levit had entered summary judgment against Levit because he
had failed to use Rule 306(a)(4) after he learned of dismissal on the 91st day after the order.
Id. at 469.
183. Mehra, 854 S.W.2d at 189.
184. Id. (Appellant's complaint in motion for new trial did not alert the trial court that it
was complaining about the possibility of a double recovery and was not preserved for review
on appeal).
185. San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Mach., 852 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1993, no writ).
186. Id.




B. MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
As recently noted in Sipco Services Marine, Inc. v. Wyatt Field Service
Co. ,189 Texas law has traditionally imposed two requirements for challeng-
ing the trial court's overruling a motion for directed verdict: "first, . . . the
ruling must appear in the judgment or be recited in a separate order;
(s)econd, . . . a defendant who introduces evidence after the motion for di-
rected verdict is overruled must urge the motion at the close of the case, or
else he waives it."190 Justice Cohen, concurring in Sipco, made rational pro-
posals for abandoning these two requirements. He suggested that the first
rule is a creation of the intermediate appellate courts and that an oral ruling
recorded in the statement of facts should preserve error.' 9 ' In his opinion,
the second rule is also a creation of the intermediate appellate courts and
should not be applied in nonjury cases. 192
The Houston Court of Appeals in Hudson v. Winn 193 held that the trial
court in a nonjury trial does not err by failing to state the specific grounds
relied on in granting judgment at the close of the plaintiff's case, despite the
mandate of rule 268 of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure, which specifies
that "a motion for directed verdict shall state specific grounds therefor."'
194
The court considered the motion in a nonjury case to be a motion for judg-
ment, not a motion for directed erdict.195 The court observed that a motion
for judgment in a nonjury trial and a motion for directed verdict in a jury
trial are inherently different because the judge in a nonjury trial has the
power to decide fact issues and make a determination on the merits and is
authorized to rule on both the factual and legal issues at the close of the
plaintiff's case-in-chief. 196 The court decided that by granting the defend-
ant's motion for judgment, the trial court is presumed to have ruled on the
sufficiency of the factual evidence. 197
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S PLENARY POWER'
1. Setting Aside Order Granting New Trial
According to the Texas Supreme Court in Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo198 a
trial court has the authority to reconsider its own order for new trial during
its plenary power. 199 In Fruehauf the trial court signed a take-nothing judg-
ment. On the seventy-fourth day after the judgment was signed, the trial
189. 857 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
190. Id. at 608 (Cohen, J. concurring).
191. Id. at 609.
192. Id. Justice Cohen emphasized that on review of a denial of a motion for directed
verdict at the close of plaintiff's case, the court should not consider evidence introduced after
the motion was denied. Id. at 611. Practitioners may want to raise this point in the appropri-
ate cases.
193. 859 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).




198. 848 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
199. Id. at 84.
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court granted the plaintiffs' motion for new trial. On the seventy-fifth day,
the trial court set aside its order granting a new trial and denied the motion.
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not have the authority
during the seventy-five-day period provided in rule 329b of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure to vacate the previously granted motion for new trial. 2° °
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, noting that an order
granting a new trial is an interlocutory order, and the trial court has the
power to set aside its interlocutory orders at any time before final judg-
ment. 20 1 In addition, it has plenary power over a judgment until it becomes
final. 20 2 Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had the authority to
set aside the order granting a new trial on the seventy-fifth day after the
judgment was signed. 20 3
Section (e) of Rule 329b gives the trial court an additional thirty days of
plenary power beyond the original seventy-five but limits that power to rul-
ings on motions for new trial that have been overruled, not granted. 2 °4
Therefore, the trial court acts without authority when during that thirty
days, it enters an order denying a new trial previously granted more than
seventy-five days after the judgment was signed.20 5
2. Necessity for Written Order
In Faulkner v. Culver 206 the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on December 15, 1989, and the plaintiffs timely filed a
motion for new trial on January 15, 1990. At a hearing on March 1, 1990,
the trial court orally vacated the summary judgment and made a corre-
sponding entry on the docket. The plaintiffs' attorney apparently tried to
determine whether the judge signed a written order but was told that the file
was in the judge's chambers and could not be retrieved. The judge did not
sign a written order vacating the summary judgment until November 8,
1990. When a replacement judge ruled the November 8, 1990 order effective
and ordered the parties to trial, the defendant sought a writ of mandamus.
The supreme court held that the November 8, 1990 order vacating the
summary judgment was a nullity because it was signed after the court's ple-
nary power had expired. 20 7 Rule 329b(c) requires that an order granting a
new trial or correcting, modifying, or reforming a judgment must be written
and signed. 20 8 The trial court's oral pronouncement on March 1, 1990 and
the corresponding docket entry were ineffective. Therefore, the motion for
new trial was overruled by operation of law seventy-five days after the sum-
200. See Carrillo v. Fruehauf Corp., 838 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992),
rev'd, 848 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
201. Carillo, 848 S.W.2d at 84.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
205. Hunter v. O'Neill, 854 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (orig.
proceeding).
206. 851 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1993).
207. Id. at 188.
208. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
mary judgment was signed, the trial court's plenary power expired thirty
days later, and the summary judgment became final.20 9 The November 8,
1990 order purporting to vacate the summary judgment was a nullity. 210
D. MOTIONS THAT EXTEND THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
1. Premature Motions
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306c and Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 58(a), certain pleadings are effective even if prematurely filed.
For example, Rule 306c provides that a motion for new trial filed before the
judgment is signed is deemed filed on the date of, but subsequent to, the
signing of the judgment. Thus, the premature motion for new trial extends
the appellate timetable just as a motion for new trial that is timely filed after
the judgment is signed.211
If, however, the premature motion is prematurely overruled (i.e., over-
ruled before the judgment is signed), a different result may occur. While the
Court of Appeals for the First District held in Harris County Hospital Dis-
trict v. Estrada212 that a motion for new trial that is both filed and overruled
before the judgment is signed is effective to extend the appellate timetable,
the Dallas court reached the opposite conclusion in A.G. Solar and Com-
pany, Inc. v. Nordyke.213 In light of the purpose of Rule 306c and Rule
58(a), the Estrada court's refusal to apply a different rule to a premature
motion that had been prematurely overruled than to a premature motion
that had not been prematurely overruled seems preferable.
2. Motions to Reinstate
The supreme court has recognized that a motion to reinstate after a case is
dismissed for want of prosecution is analogous to a motion for new trial. 21 4
Thus, a motion to reinstate filed after an order of dismissal is signed extends
the appellate timetable. Motions to reinstate, however, are not specifically
included in Rule 306c governing "Prematurely Filed Documents." On this
basis, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in Brim Laundry Machinery
Co. v. Washex Machinery Corp.21 5 that a premature motion to reinstate does
not extend the appellate timetable.21 6
209. Faulkner, 851 S.W.2d at 188.
210. Id.
211. Dunn v. City of Tyler, 848 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, no writ).
Likewise, an appeal bond prematurely filed before a final judgment is entered may be effective
to invoke appellate court jurisdiction over an appeal from a subsequent judgment disposing of
all parties and issues before the trial court. Berry-Parks Rental Equip. v. Sinsheimer, 842
S.W.2d 754, 756-57 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1992, no writ).
212. 831 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
213. 744 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
214. Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, 705 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1986).
215. 854 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
216. Id. at 301.
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V. APPEALS FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The supreme court decided two significant summary judgment cases dur-
ing the Survey period. In McConnell v. Southside Independent School Dis-
trict 2 17 it held that the grounds for summary judgment must be expressly
presented in the summary judgment motion itself.218 A party may not rely
on appeal upon grounds presented in a brief filed in support of the motion or
in the summary judgment evidence. 219 To preserve a complaint that a sum-
mary judgment motion is defective, the non-movant need not object or ex-
cept to a defective motion for summary judgment if (1) the grounds are not
expressly presented in the motion itself, or (2) the motion expressly presents
certain grounds, but not all grounds for summary judgment. 220 The non-
movant must object, however, if the grounds asserted by the movant are
unclear or ambiguous. 22'
The nonmovant must also be specific in answer or response to the sum-
mary judgment. 222 Nonetheless, even if a non-movant does not present any
issues in response or answer, the movant must still establish its entitlement
to summary judgment. 223 Summary judgment by default is not the result of
a non-movant's failure to respond. 224 The consequence is that the non-mo-
vant is limited on appeal to arguing the legal sufficiency of the grounds
presented by movant. 225
In its recent decision in Mafridge v. Ross 2 26 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the inclusion of "Mother Hubbard" language
or its equivalent in an order granting summary judgment makes an other-
wise partial summary judgment final for appeal purposes. The court con-
cluded that it does. A Mother Hubbard clause recites that all relief not
expressly granted is denied.227 An acceptable equivalent of such a clause is a
statement that the summary judgment is granted as to all claims asserted by
plaintiff or a statement that plaintiff takes nothing against defendant. 228 If a
summary judgment appears to be final, as evidenced by the inclusion of lan-
guage purporting to dispose of all claims or parties, "the judgment should be
treated as final for purposes of appeal."' 229 If, due to the Mother Hubbard
language, the judgment grants more relief than requested, the appellate
217. 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993).
218. Id. at 341.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 342.
221. Id. at 342-43. If defects occur in an affidavit rather than a motion, a party must have
the opportunity to amend defective affidavits after objection before those defects are used to
defeat a summary judgment opponent. In Wyatt v. McGregor, 855 S.W.2d 5, 18 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied), the court held that a trial court's failure to allow a party to
amend cancels any objection and the defect is waived.
222. Id. at 341.
223. Id. at 343.
224. Id. at 342.
225. Id. at 343.
226. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
227. Id. at 590 n.I.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 592.
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court should reverse and remand the judgment but not dismiss it. 230
The language in the summary judgment order in Mafridge, stated, "It is
therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Motion for Summary
Judgment of Defendant should in all things be granted and that Plaintiff take
nothing against Defendant." 23 1 The supreme court held that the language in
the judgment clearly evidenced the trial court's intent to dispose of all
claims, and the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal for want of
jurisdiction. 232 The supreme court remanded the case to the court of ap-
peals for that court to determine the propriety of the trial court's granting of
the summary judgment on the merits. 233
A summary judgment is not entitled to the same deference given to a judg-
ment following a trial on the merits. 234 If a movant for summary judgment
fails to prove entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the court of appeals
must remand the case for a trial on the merits. 235 The exception to this rule
is when both parties move for summary judgment and one motion is granted
and the other is denied. In that case, the appellate court should determine
all questions presented and may reverse the trial court's judgment and
render such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. 236
VI. DUTIES AND LIMITS OF THE APPELLATE COURT
A. DUTY TO ADDRESS MERITS
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 80(b), the court of appeals may
dispose of an appeal by: (1) affirming the trial court's judgment; (2) modify-
ing the trial court's judgment by correcting or reforming it; (3) reversing the
trial court's judgment and dismissing the case or rendering the judgment or
decree that the court below should have rendered; or (4) reversing the trial
court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings. The supreme
court held in Blair v. Fletcher 237 that a court of appeals has no authority to
decline to decide an appeal on the merits when it has jurisdiction to do so. 238
The court of appeals cannot vacate the trial court's judgment and remand
the case for reconsideration by the trial court because of a change in the
applicable law while the appeal was pending. It must apply the law as it
exists at the time of the appeal. 239
230. Id.
231. Id. at 591.
232. Id. at 592.
233. Id.
234. Orix Credit Alliance v. OmniBank, 858 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, writ denied).
235. Id. at 589.
236. Id.
237. 849 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1993).
238. Id. at 345-46. Although TEX. R. App. P. 180 authorizes the supreme court to vacate
the court of appeals' judgment and remand to that court without first rendering a decision on
the merits, the courts of appeals are not authorized to do so with respect to the judgments of
the trial court. Id. at 346.
239. Blair, 849 S.W.2d at 345.
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B. GRANTING RELIEF NOT SOUGHT
In Horrocks v. Texas Department of Transportation240 the supreme court
held that the court of appeals erred in rendering judgment based on a no
evidence point preserved solely in a motion for new trial. The court noted
that "[w]hen reversing trial court judgments, the [appellate) court shall pro-
ceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have ren-
dered .... ,,241 Because the defendant requested only a new trial, that was
the only relief to which it was entitled.
In Caballero v. Central Power and Light Co. 242 the appellant filed an appli-
cation for writ of error complaining of the appellate court's reversal and
remand for a new trial. In response to the appellant's application for writ of
error, the appellee asserted "rendition" points of error. The appellee, how-
ever, did not file a separate writ of error asserting that the appellate court
should have reversed and rendered rather than reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The Texas Supreme Court held that the appellee's failure to file a
separate application for writ of error seeking affirmative relief beyond the
reversal and remand afforded by the court of appeals' judgment constituted a
waiver of its rendition points.243
C. REFUSAL TO VACATE OPINION UPON SETTLEMENT
After a jury trial resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and affirm-
ance by the Houston Court of Appeals of the Fourteenth District, the parties
in Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood West Civil Association244 decided to
settle. Prior to reaching the settlement agreement, the defendants filed an
application for writ of error with the Texas Supreme Court. After settling,
the parties filed a joint motion to grant application for writ of error. In their
joint application, the parties stated that "as a condition precedent to [the]
settlement, the parties have agreed that the petitioners' application for writ
of error should be granted; the judgments of the court of appeals and the
trial court should be vacated; [and] the opinion of the court of appeals
should be vacated. '245
The supreme court first overruled the parties' joint motion for writ but on
rehearing granted it. It refused to vacate the opinion of the court of appeals,
however. The court emphasized that courts are endowed with "a public
purpose-they do not sit merely as private tribunals to resolve private dis-
putes."' 246 While settlement is to be encouraged, the court stated, "a private
agreement between litigants should not operate to vacate a court's writing on
matters of public importance. ' 24 7 Although it granted the parties' applica-
tion for writ, set aside the judgments of the appellate and trial courts and
240. 852 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
241. Id. at 498 (emphasis in original); TEX. R. App. P. 81(c).
242. 858 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. 1993).
243. Id. at 362.
244. 860 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1993).





remanded the cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance
with the settlement agreement of the parties, the supreme court did not va-
cate the opinion of the court of appeals. 248 Despite the granting of the appli-
cation for writ of error, the supreme court held that the precedential
authority of a court of appeals' opinion that is not vacated under the circum-
stances of this case is equivalent to a "writ dismissed" case. 249
D. DISMISSAL FOR MOOTNESS
In Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home and Service Agency250 the
supreme court emphasized that a dismissal for mootness is not a ruling on
the merits.251 In that case, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory
relief when she was denied employment as an adoption worker with the de-
fendant Agency because she was Jewish and the Agency hired only Chris-
tians. After the trial court rendered judgment in the Agency's favor, on the
basis that the Agency was a religious corporation exempted from the general
prohibition of discriminatory hiring practices contained in the Texas Com-
mission on Human Rights Act, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment, the plaintiff filed an application for writ of error to the
Texas Supreme Court. Before the case was argued to the supreme court, the
Agency withdrew from offering adoption services and abolished the position
originally sought by the plaintiff.
At argument, the Agency asserted that the controversy upon which the
case was based was moot and sought dismissal of the supreme court appeal.
The supreme court agreed the appeal should be dismissed as moot. 25 2 In
response to Justice Doggett's dissenting argument that such dismissal would
endorse evasion of "our state prohibition against employment discrimina-
tion," the majority held that dismissal for mootness is not a ruling on the
merits. The court noted that the court's duty to dismiss moot cases arises
from a proper respect for the judicial branch's unique role under our consti-
tution: to decide contested cases. 253 Under the Texas Constitution, the
court concluded, "[c]ourts simply have no jurisdiction to render advisory
opinions." 254
VII. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
A. PARTIES ENTITLED TO APPEAL
Relying on a case decided in 1893, the Texas Supreme Court in Vanscot
Concrete Co. v. Bailey 255 reversed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and
held that a corporation has the right to appeal a trial court's judgment
248. Id. at 74.
249. Id. at 73 n.3.
250. 847 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1993).
251. Id. at 229.
252. Id. at 230.
253. Id. at 229.
254. Id.
255. 853 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
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against it regardless of the corporation's legal existence.256 In Vanscot, the
plaintiff was burned when he was splashed by contaminated concrete, which
was delivered by a truck labeled "Express Pennington." Vanscot had previ-
ously done business under that name but had merged with another corpora-
tion and ceased doing business about three months before the accident. The
new company, Tarmac Texas, acquired the name "Express Pennington" but
failed to update the county clerk's assumed name certificate record.
Although Vanscot raised the issue of its nonexistence in a motion for sum-
mary judgment prior to trial, the plaintiff, nonetheless, obtained a judgment
against Vanscot.
Vanscot appealed. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed Van-
scot's appeal on the ground that a corporation that is no longer in existence
cannot prosecute an appeal.2 5 7 Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Texas Trunk Co. v. Jackson,258 the supreme court held that "corpora-
tions have the same right to have judgments against them revised by the
appellate courts as have persons, and even extinguished corporations are en-
titled to a hearing before the appellate courts. '259
B. THE APPEAL BOND OR CASH DEPOSIT
1. Motion for Extension of Time to File Cost Bond
A motion for extension of time to file a cost bond must be filed in the court
of appeals within fifteen days after the last day for filing the bond.260 The
court of appeals has no authority to act upon a motion for extension errone-
ously filed in the trial court. Although the court of appeals has discretion
under Rule 46(f) to permit the amendment of a defective bond, the court has
no discretion to permit the late filing of a bond.261
The Texarkana Court of Appeals in Miller v. Miller 262 properly sought
guidance from the supreme court on this issue. Although the court of ap-
peals was "bound by the clear and mandatory language of Rule 41(a)(2) that
the [motion for extension] must be filed in the appellate court" and had no
choice but to dismiss the appeal, the court stated:
We would prefer to reach the merits of this and similar cases .... We
invite the Texas Supreme Court to revisit Rule 41 and to consider
amending the language of that rule so as to give appellate courts discre-
tion to act on a timely filed motion for extension of time to file a bond,
erroneously filed in the trial court, when the bond itself was properly
256. Id. at 526.
257. Vanscot Concrete Co. v. Bailey, 843 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992),
rev'd, 853 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1993).
258. 85 Tex. 605, 22 S.W. 1030 (1893), overruled on other grounds by Scurlock Oil Co. v.
Smith, 724 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1986).
259. Vanscot, 853 S.W.2d. at 526 (citing Texas Trunk, 22 S.W.2d at 1032).
260. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(2).
261. See Ludwig v. Enserch Corp., 845 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ) ("[ft]he time limits for filing of bonds on appeal cannot be dispensed with or
enlarged for any reason. These restrictions are mandatory and jurisdictional.").
262. 848 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ) (per curiam).
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filed pursuant to the rules.263
2. Omission of Appellee's Name from Clerk's Certificate
The appellants in Vail v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB 264 elected to make a
cash deposit in lieu of a surety bond to perfect their appeal pursuant to
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b) and 48. The clerk filed his certifi-
cate showing that the deposit had been made but the clerk's certificate omit-
ted one of the appellee's names. The missing appellee filed a motion to be
dismissed from the appeal, contending that the Vails had failed to perfect
their appeal as to him. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that appellate
courts may not dismiss an appeal for procedural defects of substance or form
in an appeal bond, or in a cash deposit made in lieu of an appeal bond. 265 If
such a defect exists, the appellate court must grant the appellants an oppor-
tunity to obtain and file an amended certificate. The court concluded that no
defect existed in this case because the appeal was perfected by a cash deposit
and the only defect was in the clerk's certificate of that deposit. An appeal is
perfected by the cash deposit, not by the clerk's certificate. 266
3. Administrative Requirement of Cash or Supersedeas Bond
In Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board 267 the Texas
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the requirement that a party seeking
judicial review of an administrative decision either pay a supersedeas bond
or cash deposit into an escrow account in the full amount of the penalties
assessed by the administrative agency or forfeit the right to judicial re-
view.268 The supreme court noted that under the open courts provision in
Texas, citizens must have access to courts unimpeded by unreasonable finan-
cial barriers and that, in most other jurisdictions, similar administrative pre-
payment provisions are required only to stay execution of judgments and are
not prerequisites to the right to appeal itself.269
4. Exemption from Filing Appeal Bond
A political subdivision of the state or governmental entity is exempt from
filing an appeal bond. 270 The appeal, when perfected, automatically super-
sedes the judgment of the trial court. The court in Enriquez v. Hooten,271
noting that this exemption applies to a county and those who act in an offi-
cial capacity for the county, held that the exemption applied to the respon-
dent county commissioners and that the trial court's judgment was
263. Id. at 344.
264. 859 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
265. Id. at 426.
266. Id. at 427; see TEX. R. App. P. 46(b).
267. 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993).
268. Id. at 450; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 382.089(a) and 382.089(b),
361.252(k) and 361.252(1) (Vernon 1992); and TEX. WATER CODE § 26.136(j) (Vernon 1988).
269. Id. at 448 n. 11.
270. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1986).
271. 857 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
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superseded when the notice of appeal was filed.272
5. Order Increasing Amount of Appeal Bond
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c), the trial court, on its
own motion or the motion of any party, may increase or decrease the
amount of the bond or deposit required for costs on appeal. 273 A court's
order increasing the amount of the bond or cash deposit, however, does not
affect the perfecting of the appeal or the appellate court's jurisdiction. If the
appellate court agrees with the trial court that the amount should be in-
creased and the appellant fails to post the amount of the increased bond, the
appellate court may dismiss the appeal. 274
6. Pauper's Affidavit
The supreme court in Hughes v. Habitat Apartments27 5 held that a pau-
per's affidavit filed by a defendant suffices as a pro se answer, entitling the
defendant to notice of a hearing on a motion for default judgment, if the
affidavit supplies information identifying the case and parties and provides
the defendant's current address. In Prince v. First City Texas276 the court
held that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(3)(B)'s requirement of
notice to the court reporter that a pauper's affidavit has been filed does not
apply in an appeal from a summary judgment even if there is a statement of
facts from the summary judgment hearing. 277
C. WAIVER OR MOOTNESS
A party does not waive the right to appeal by involuntarily paying a judg-
ment after execution has issued. In Riner v. Briargrove Park Property Own-
ers, Inc. 278 the Texas Supreme Court noted that usually, when a judgment
debtor voluntarily satisfies a judgment rendered against him, the cause be-
comes moot, the judgment debtor waives his right to an appeal and the case
is dismissed. 279 This rule prevents a party who voluntarily pays a judgment
from later changing his mind and seeking the court's aid in recovering pay-
ment.280 The judgment debtor's appeal is not moot, however, if a party does
not voluntarily pay a judgment. A party does not voluntarily pay a judg-
ment if he satisfies that judgment after execution of a judgment. 28 1
272. Id. at 154-55. Absent a bona fide dispute as to whether an appellant is exempted from
having to file an appeal bond to perfect his appeal, an appellate cost bond is a procedural
requirement to perfect an appeal and properly invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Wilcox v. Seelbinder, 840 S.W.2d 680, 682-83 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
273. TEX. R. App. P. 46(c).
274. TEX. R. App. P. 46(c), 60(a). See Maniccia v. Johnson & Gibbs, P.C., 844 S.W.2d
296, 297 n.2 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
275. 860 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1993).
276. 853 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
277. Id. at 693.
278. 858 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. In Briargrove, the judgment creditor obtained a writ of execution, and an order of
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As a general rule, an appeal is moot when the court's action on the merits
cannot affect the rights of the parties. When the court's action affects the
rights of the parties, however, the appeal should not be dismissed as moot.
In VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young 282 the trial court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's lawsuit filed in Texas based on forum non
conveniens. 2 83 The plaintiff simultaneously appealed the trial court's dismis-
sal and filed suit against the defendant in California. The defendant moved
to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the filing of the California suit rendered
the appeal moot because the California filing indicated VE's acquiescence
that California was the forum of convenience, thereby mooting any contro-
versy before the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed and dismissed
the plaintiff's appeal. Holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing
the appeal as moot, the Texas Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff's mere
filing suit in California did not moot the issue of whether Texas was a proper
forum for VE's suit against the defendant, nor did it, without more, indicate
VE's agreement that California was the forum of convenience.284 Identical
suits may be pending in different states. 285
D. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
1. Filing a Request for Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
In Zimmerman v. Robinson286 the court held that the filing of a request
for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case that has not been tried is
insufficient to expand the thirty-day period for perfection of appeal. 287 In
Zimmerman, the plaintiff attempted to appeal from an order dismissing his
original petition brought against the independent executor of an estate to
recover royalties paid to the estate. The trial court dismissed his petition for
want of jurisdiction solely on the defendant's motion to dismiss without a
hearing. The plaintiff filed his notice of appeal and a request for findings of
fact and conclusions of law one week after the court signed the dismissal
order but did not file his cost bond until eighty-two days after dismissal.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals acknowledged that under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 41(a)(1) a timely filing of a request for findings of fact
and conclusions of law will extend the time for appeal to ninety days after
the judgment is signed but noted that this extension occurs only in a case
"tried" without a jury.288 To determine the meaning of the word "tried" in
Rule 41(a)(1), the court looked to case law interpreting the word "tried"
sale of the property in dispute was issued. The judgment debtor, to avoid the sale of the
property, paid the judgment. Both parties appealed and the court of appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that the judgment-debtor had waived his right to an appeal by paying the
judgment after its execution.
282. 860 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
283. Id. at 84.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. 862 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
287. Id. at 164.
288. Id. at 163; TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(l).
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under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296,289 which holds that a trial judge
has the authority and duty to file requested findings and conclusions "where
there has been an evidentiary hearing to the court or a bench trial on the
merits. '290 The court noted that the case law interpreting the word "tried"
under Rule 296 holds that a trial court does not have a duty to file requested
findings and conclusions from postjudgment hearings, default judgments, or
dismissed complaints.291 The court concluded Rule 41(a)(1) should be con-
strued consistent with rule 296 because any other interpretation would ig-
nore the clear and concise language of Rule 41(a)(1) and render the word
"tried" meaningless. 292 A case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without an
evidentiary hearing has not been "tried," and the request for findings and
conclusions does not extend the appellate timetable. 293 The appellant in
Zimmerman, therefore, failed to timely perfect his appeal when he filed his
cost bond eighty-two days after the order of dismissal was signed.294
2. Failure to Receive Notice of Judgment
When a party fails to receive notice within twenty days of the signing of
the trial court's judgment as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
306a(3), the trial court's plenary power is extended, and the usual appellate
timetable will not begin to run until the party or his attorney receives notice
from the clerk of the court or acquires actual notice if within ninety days of
the signing of judgment. 295 To establish the application of 306a(4), the party
adversely affected must (a) have received no notice or actual knowledge
within twenty days after the judgment is signed; (b) received notice or ac-
quire actual knowledge within ninety days after the judgment is signed; (c)
prove in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the
party first acquired notice or actual knowledge of the signing and that this
date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed. 296 The ap-
pellant in Carrera v. Marsh learned the hard way that only a sworn motion
and notice will do.297 The El Paso Court of Appeals found the unsworn
motion filed with the trial court in that case insufficient to establish the ap-
plication of Rule 306a(4), and the appellate timetable ran as usual, making
289. Rule 296 permits any party to request the court to state in writing its findings and
conclusions in cases "tried" without a jury. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
290. Zimmerman, 862 S.W.2d at 163-64 (citing Timmons v. Luce, 840 S.W.2d 582, 586
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ); Electronic Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co., Inc.,
821 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)).
291. Zimmerman, 862 S.W.2d at 163-64 (citing Johnson v. J. W. Const. Co., 717 S.W.2d
464, 468 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Eichelberger v. Balette, 841 S.W.2d 508, 510
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Nixon v. Nixon, 348 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
292. Zimmerman, 862 S.W.2d at 163-64.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(3), 306a(4); Carrera v. Marsh, 847 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1993, no writ). See Levit v. Adams, 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
296. 847 S.W.2d at 341; TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4) and (5).





A. APPEALING BY WRIT OF ERROR
To proceed by writ of error review under Texas Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure 45, a petitioner must (1) file the writ within six months after the judg-
ment is signed; (2) be a party to the suit; (3) not have participated in the
actual trial of the case in the trial court; and (4) show error apparent from
the face of the record. In Girdley v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. ,299
the El Paso Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of Rule 45's "nonpar-
ticipation in the actual trial" requirement. The party's participation, the
court held, need not be at the actual trial on the merits; rather, participation
in the decision-making event producing the final judgment adjudicating a
party's right will cut off that party's ability to proceed by writ of error. 3° °
In Girdley, the appellants were fully and actively represented by counsel
during several critical stages of the case, including the hearing on a motion
for sanctions after which the trial court entered an order striking the appel-
lants' pleadings. They were also present at several critical hearings that led
to the trial court's judgment against them. As a result, the court held the
appellants did participate in the actual trial of the case in the trial court
within the meaning of Rule 45. 301 Therefore, the court could not entertain
their application for writ of error.
Earlier in the year, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue
and reached a consistent result. In South Mill Mushrooms Sales v.
Weenick 30 2 the appellants attempting to appeal by writ of error did not par-
ticipate in the trial when default judgment was entered, but they did file a
motion for new trial and attended the hearing on that motion. "Actual
trial," the Dallas court stated, "is defined to be the hearing in open court,
leading up to the rendition of judgment on the questions of law and fact". 30 3
The extent of participation in the actual trial to disqualify a party is a matter
of degree. The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has held that the
filing of a motion for new trial is not participation at trial. 3° 4 The appellees
pointed out, however, that the appellants in Weenick not only filed a motion
for new trial but also participated in the hearing on the motion and therefore
participated in "actual trial" under Rule 45. The Dallas court rejected the
appellee's argument, holding that the controlling requirement that a party
not participate in the trial only eliminates the right of review by writ of error
for "those who take part in a hearing that leads to the final judgment." 30 5
298. Id.
299. 869 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
300. Id. at 411.
301. Id.
302. 851 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
303. Id. at 348.
304. Id. (citing Lawyers Lloyds of Texas v. Webb, 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1097-98 (Tex. 1941)).
305. Id. at 349.
[Vol. 47
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Rule 45(b), the court concluded, "is not intended to cut off the right of those
who discover that a judgment has been rendered against them and partici-
pate only to the extent of pursuing a motion for new trial."'30 6
In McKernan v. Riverside National Bank, NA. 307 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that the defendant, appealing by writ of error from a default
judgment, failed to show error apparent from the face of the record. 308 The
trial court in that case entered a default judgment against the defendant
based on the plaintiff's first amended petition that was never served on de-
fendant. The court held that error was not apparent from the face of the
record because the first amended petition did not substantially alter the
plaintiff's first petition and did not seek a more onerous judgment from the
defendant. 309
In Robertson v. Hide-A- Way Lake Club, Inc. 310 the court held that parties
must strictly comply with the explicit conditions for appealing by petition
for writ of error. Each of the four requisites of an appeal by writ of error is
"mandatory and jurisdictional."' 311 Finding that the appellant in Robertson
had participated in the actual trial, which disqualified him from suing out a
writ of error, the court pointed out that counsel for the appellant prepared
and submitted the non-suit order that directly caused the disposition of the
case. Only the appellant and his counsel played a role in the termination of
the suit. Preparing and submitting the non-suit order to the court consti-
tuted participation in the actual trial of the case. 312 On the other hand, a
party who seeks to get his case reinstated following dismissal for want of
prosecution and seeks a nunc pro tunc order correcting the dismissal order
does not "participate in actual trial" from which judgment was rendered to
the extent that his rights to appeal by writ of error are cut off.31 3
B. APPEALING BY BILL OF REVIEW
A bill of review is an equitable proceeding available in some circumstances
to set aside a judgment after the time for ordinary appeal has run.314 To
obtain a bill of review, the complainant must allege and prove (1) a meritori-
ous defense (2) which he was prevented from making by the fraud, accident
or wrongful act of the opposite party, (3) unmixed with any fault or negli-
gence of his own. 31 5 In McRoberts v. Ryals the supreme court considered by
306. Id. In response to the argument that appellants could have appealed from the denial
of the motion for new trial, the court emphasized that the supreme court's test for participa-
tion at trial does not rest on the opportunity to appeal by ordinary means. Id.
307. 858 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
308. Id. at 614-15.
309. Id. at 615.
310. 856 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, no writ).
311. Id. at 843.
312. Id.
313. Brim Laundry Machinery Co., Inc. v. Washex Machinery Corp., 854 S.W.2d 297, 299
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ requested). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 114
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
314. McRoberts v. Ryals, 863 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1993) (Enoch J., dissenting).
315. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. 1950).
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bill of review the complaint engendered by the clerk's failure to timely assign
a new cause number in a severed action and the subsequent dismissal of an
appeal filed under the original cause number.3 16
C. ACCELERATED APPEALS
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(c) allows an accelerated appeal to
be submitted without briefs. In light of this rule, the First Court of Appeals
of Houston reasoned that, by extension, it could rule on an issue in an accel-
erated appeal raised only by a general point of error, despite the fact that
such point of error would not otherwise preserve error because of its lack of
specificity.31 7 The supreme court reversed the Houston Court of Appeals,
stating that Rule 42 contains nothing that could permit a court of appeals to
decide issues without briefing in cases that are otherwise fully briefed.
31 8
Rule 42, the supreme court held, grants the courts of appeals only the au-
thority to permit the parties to an appeal to submit the whole case without
briefs on accelerated appeal.
3 19
Apparently, however, appellate courts have broad authority to allow
materials to be filed late in accelerated appeals. In Merrill Lynch v. Ed-
dings3 20 the appellant appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbi-
tration. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(a)(3), the record in
the accelerated appeal was due thirty days after the order denying the mo-
tion was signed. The appellants tendered the record to the clerk approxi-
mately two weeks late, but it was not filed because it was not timely. 32 ' The
Waco court granted the appellant's motion to extend the time for filing the
record, holding that the language in Rule 42(a)(3), which states that
"[flailure to file either the record or appellant's brief within the time speci-
fied, unless reasonably explained, shall be grounds for dismissal or affirm-
ance under Rule 60, but shall not affect the court's jurisdiction or its
authority to consider materialfiled late," gives appellate courts broad author-
ity to allow materials to be filed late in accelerated appeals. 322
D. APPEALS FROM BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS
In State Bar of Texas v. Humphreys323 the Texas Supreme Court clarified
the procedure for appeal under Rule 7.11 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure. Rule 7.11 provides that an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court
from a determination of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals must be filed
with the clerk of the supreme court within fourteen days after the receipt by
the appealing party of the Board's determination from which the appeal is
316. McRoberts, 863 S.W.2d at 451.
317. Metcalfe v. Walling, 856 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), rev'd,
863 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1993).
318. Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 56.
319. Id.
320. 838 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied).
321. Id. at 876.
322. Id. at 877; TEX. R. App. P. 42(a)(3) (emphasis added).
323. No. D-3811, 1993 WL 218649 (Tex. June 23, 1993) (per curiam).
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taken. While the rule is unclear, the court held that only a notice of appeal,
rather than the entire appeal, must be filed within the fourteen days after
receipt of the notice of the Board's determination. 32 4  The court observed
that the procedures should resemble those on appeal from a trial court to the
court of appeals. Therefore, the notice must be filed directly with the Texas
Supreme Court within fourteen days, and the record must be filed within
sixty days after the Board's determination. 325 The appealing party's brief is
due thirty days after the record is filed, and the responding party's brief is
due within twenty-five days thereafter.3 26
E. APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
1. The Exhaustion Doctrine
Only a party that has exhausted all available administrative remedies may
seek judicial review of an agency decision. In Texas Water Commission v.
Dellana327 the Texas Supreme Court held that the exhaustion doctrine, codi-
fied in the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA),328
requires the filing of a motion for rehearing before the agency as a prerequi-
site to judicial review. 32 9 Only after exhausting administrative remedies may
the party petition for judicial review, and a court abuses its discretion by
permitting a party to circumvent the exhaustion of remedies requirement. 330
2. The Record
When seeking judicial review of an agency decision, a party must follow
the procedural requirements of APTRA.331 Section 19(d)(3) of APTRA
provides that a party seeking judicial review of an agency decision (other
than by trial de novo), "shall offer, and the reviewing court shall admit, the
agency record into evidence as an exhibit." Failure to have the agency rec-
ord admitted into evidence as an exhibit before the trial court and timely
filed as part of the statement of facts on appeal prevents the agency record
from being a proper part of the appellate record. 332
IV. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
A. POINTS OF ERROR
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 74(d) requires that "[a] statement of
the points upon which an appeal is predicated shall be stated in short form
324. Id. at *1.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 849 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1993).
328. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, §§ 19(a), 16(e) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
329. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d at 810.
330. Id.
331. Commerce Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas Educ. Agency, 859 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp.
1993).




without argument and be separately numbered. ' 333 In Copher v. First State
Bank3 34 the appellant listed his points of error under letters of the alphabet
(a) through (i). The court of appeals considered the points in the form sub-
mitted but urged counsel to number points separately as the rule requires. 335
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 74(0, a party must include a
discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon to support the issues
raised on appeal. Failure to cite any authority in support of a point of error
constitutes waiver of the point.3 36 Further, a party waives any arguments he
fails to mention in his brief before the court of appeals, regardless of his
challenges at the trial court level. 337
A multifarious point of error that violates Texas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 74 may nonetheless be considered in the interest of justice. In Thomp-
son v. Texas Department of Human Resources,3 38 a paternity suit, appellant
attacked the nunc pro tunc judgment that purportedly corrected a clerical
error in a nonsuit order with a single point of error that stated: "There is no
clerical error and the original judgment was not subject to correction by
entry of judgment nunc pro tunc." The court of appeals held that the point
of error violated Rule 74 but agreed to consider it in the interest of justice.3 39
The distinction between a point of error that complains that the evidence
is insufficient to support a finding and a point of error that complains that
the finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence is
important. 340 A point of error complaining the finding is against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence is proper when an appellant is
attacking an adverse finding on which the appellant had the burden of
-proof.34 1 A point of error complaining the evidence is insufficient to support
a finding is proper when the appellant is attacking an adverse finding regard-
ing an issue on which the appellant did not have the burden of proof.
34 2
Appellants should not raise both complaints against the same finding as the
appellate court will not consider the point of error. 34 3
Finally, a point of error that recites a standard of evidentiary review other
than either preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence
does not raise a valid point of error and will not be reviewed on appeal.
344
333. TEX. R. App. P. 74(d).
334. 852 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
335. Id. at 739.
336. D/FW Commercial Roofing Co., Inc. v. Mehra, 854 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1993, no writ).
337. Wilson v. Cinemark Corp., 858 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no
writ). See also Hunter v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 857 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (overruling point of error not supported by authority).
338. 859 S.W.2d 482, 483-84 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
339. Id. at 484.
340. Cullen Ctr. Bank v. Texas Commerce Bank, 841 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 121.
344. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d 926, 935 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, writ granted).
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In Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Lieck, the points of error arguing that
"there is no positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence" to support the jury's
answers did not correspond to either of the only two standards of evidentiary
review in Texas and therefore did not raise a valid point of error.345
B. TIME FOR FILING
The rules of appellate procedure provide deadlines for filing the original
briefs of both appellant and appellee.346 Although Rule 74(o) allows for
amendment or supplementation of briefs "at any time when justice re-
quires," the appellate rules do not provide a deadline for filing reply briefs.
Some appellate courts have local rules specifying time limits and page limits
for reply briefs. Leave of court is often required within seven days prior to
the date oral argument is scheduled.3 47
In Cornerstone Municipal Utility District v. Monsanto Co. 348 the appel-
lant-seven months after it received the appellee's brief and two days before
oral argument-filed a thirty page reply brief citing thirty-seven new cases
not cited in its original brief. Although the court of appeals did not grant
the appellee's motion to strike the "reply" brief, the court urged the supreme
court and the rules committee to amend Rule 74 to provide a specific dead-
line for the filing of a reply. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
court noted,
should provide a set time period to respond to the other side's argu-
ments if it is necessary. They should also provide that in no case should
a reply be filed without leave of court within a minimum number of
days before oral argument. . . . Counsel should be able to determine
whether a reply will be necessary once the original brief is received.
Justice is not served by the filing of a reply to a brief just two days
before argument when the original brief has been in counsel's possession
for seven months.349
Under the Beaumont Court of Appeals' interpretation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b), a metered stamp from a private office reflecting
that an appellant's brief was timely mailed, along with an attorney's affidavit
to the same effect, do not overcome the presumption of date of mailing estab-
lished by a U.S. Postal Service postmark reflecting that the brief was mailed
a day late. 350
345. Id.
346. See TEX. R. App. P. 74(k), (m).
347. See, e.g., Second Court of Appeals Local Rule I.D; Fourth Court of Appeals Local
Rule 1(A), (C); Fifth Court of Appeals Local Rule 1:74(d); Tenth Court of Appeals Local
Rule 7(f); Thirteenth Court of Appeals Local Rule IV.
348. 845 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), overruled on other grounds, 865
S.W.2d 937 (Tex. 1993).
349. Id. at 445-46.




IX. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
A. ABSENCE OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
When the record on appeal does not contain findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law and the trial court's judgment dismissing the case for want of
prosecution does not state the reason for the dismissal, the court of appeals
must affirm the trial court's dismissal on any legal theory supported by the
record.35 ' All necessary findings to support the judgment must be consid-
ered as having been impliedly found by the trial court.352
B. UNNECESSARY DESIGNATION OF TRANSCRIPT
Under Rule 53(e) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party who
requires more of the record than is necessary to present its appeal "shall be
required" to pay the costs of the unnecessary material regardless of the out-
come of the appeal. 35 3 The Amarillo Court of Appeals in Lopez v. Central
Plains Regional Hospital35 4 invoked this rule to require the appellants to
bear sixty percent of the costs of the record on appeal because sixty percent
of the record was unnecessary for presentation of their points of error.355
C. LOST OR DESTROYED RECORD ON APPEAL
The court in Born v. Virginia City Dance Hall & Saloon356 noted in inter-
preting Rule 50(e) regarding a lost or destroyed record 357 that Texas courts
hold that there are three requirements for a new trial: (1) that the appellant
has made a timely request for a statement of facts; (2) that the court re-
porter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed without the appel-
lant's fault; and (3) that the parties cannot agree on a statement of facts. 35 8
In the case of lost trial exhibits, however, the Texas courts of appeal disa-
gree as to whether Rule 50(e) allows the appellant to refuse to agree to a
substitution without any reasonable basis or justification for refusing to
agree. The Waco Court of Appeals has held that the appellant is entitled to
a new trial if he does not agree to the substitution of other documents for
351. Bilnoski v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
no writ); see also Thompson, 859 S.W.2d at 484 (noting that the record before appellate court
consisted of a statement of facts of a nunc pro tunc hearing only and the transcript, and the
statement of facts contained no testimony but only the arguments of counsel).
352. Thompson, 859 S.W.2d at 484.
353. TEX. R. App. P. 53(e).
354. 859 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
355. Id. at 607.
356. 857 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
357. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(e) provides that when the record or any portion
thereof is lost or destroyed, it may be substituted in the trial court and when so substituted the
record may be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court as in other cases. If the appel-
lant has made a timely request for a statement of facts, but the court reporter's notes and
records have been lost or destroyed without appellant's fault, the appellant is entitled to a new
trial unless the parties agree on a statement of facts.
358. Born, 857 S.W.2d at 953.
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lost trial exhibits regardless the reasonableness of his disagreement. 359 The
Corpus Christi and Texarkana Court of Appeals, on the other hand, have
upheld a trial court's substitution of exact duplicates of lost documents even
though the appellant did not agree to the substitution. 360 To hold otherwise,
the Texarkana court pointed out, when an original trial exhibit cannot be
found, would allow the losing party always to refuse to accept the substitu-
tion in order to obtain a new trial.3 61 This, result "would hinder the goal of
judicial economy and would not be in keeping with the purposes of Rule
50(e)."' 362 In the view of the Texarkana Court of Appeals, if the lost exhibits
can be replaced with identical or substantially similar documents, a party's
refusal to agree to the replacement exhibits should not automatically require
a new trial under Rule 50(e). 36 3
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Electronic Recording
Some trial courts have implemented programs for the use of an electroni-
cally recorded, audio-taped statement of facts, rather than a stenographically
recorded statement of facts. 364 The "statement of facts" in electronically
recorded proceedings may consist of the following: (1) standard cassette re-
cordings certified by the court recorder to be clear and accurate copies of the
original recording of the entire proceeding; (2) a copy of the typewritten and
original logs filed in the case and certified by the court reporter; and (3) all
exhibits filed in the case. 365 The deadline for filing an electronically re-
corded statement of facts is usually within fifteen days of the date the appeal
is perfected. 366 This deadline may cause problems for the practitioner who
does not confirm the method of compiling the statement of facts.
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Ninth Court of Appeals however,
359. Hidalgo, Chambers & Co. v. FDIC, 790 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990,
writ denied).
360. First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1993, writ denied); Hackney v. First State Bank of Honey Grove, 866 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
361. Hackney, 866 S.W.2d at 61.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., Texas Supreme Court Orders, Misc. Docket No. 91-0017 (Harris County)
No. 91-0058 (Liberty County); No. 91-0059 (Dallas County). Courts in twelve counties use
electronic recording rules. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 864 S.W.2d
58 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). Copies of the relevant supreme court orders permitting
electronic recordings are available to attorneys practicing before courts that electronically rec-
ord proceedings. TEX. R. Civ. P. 3a(5).
365. See Fazio v. Hames, 866 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ). The rules
governing electronically recorded proceedings generally require that the appellant file as an
appendix to its brief a written transcription of the portion of the statement of facts that is
relevant to the errors asserted on appeal. Id.
366. Compare TEX. R. App. P. 54(a) (deadline is sixty or ninety days after judgment
signed, depending upon whether party filed timely motion for new trial or motion to modify).
Note that the orders governing electronically recorded statements of facts do not alter other
filing deadlines such as the deadline for filing the transcript governed by Rule 54. TEX. R.
App. P. 54; see Fazio, 866 S.W.2d at 269.
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the Texas Supreme Court recently issued a conditional writ of mandamus
holding that a party's unintentional mistake regarding its obligations under
county rules and procedures for filing an electronic statement of facts is a
reasonable explanation for delay in filing under Texas Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 54(c). 367 The Beaumont Court of Appeals had withdrawn the order
granting an extension of time for filing the electronically recorded statements
of facts in National Union. It also did so in Marino v. Hartsfield,368 where
the appellant's motion urged as "reasonable explanation" for the extension
the court reporter's busy schedule; however, an affidavit of the court reporter
showed that she did not know that the case had been appealed until a few
days before the statement of facts was due. The court noted the appellant's
failure to make a timely request of the court reporter to prepare the state-
ment of facts does not justify an extension of time.369
In Fazio v. Hames the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the appellant's
explanation that the court reporter told them she had filed the statement of
facts on the day they were due (although she had not), was a reasonable
explanation for their motion to extend the time for filing.370 The Dallas
court concluded that the requirements of Rule 54(c) were met since the ap-
pellant's noncompliance "was not deliberate or intentional and was the re-
sult of mistake." '37 1
2. Incomplete Statement of Facts
The appellant has the burden of presenting to the appellate court a suffi-
cient record to show error requiring reversal. 372 In Fisher v. Evans3 7 3 the
jury returned a verdict favorable to the appellant, but the trial court signed a
judgment n.o.v. The appellant did not bring forward a complete statement
of facts, and the court of appeals presumed that the omitted portions of the
record supported the judgment. 374
3. Summary Judgment Hearing
An appeal from a summary judgment does not require a statement of
facts. A party is not required to obtain transcriptions of non-evidentiary
hearings to preserve error.375
X. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court has assisted practitioners in its decision in State
367. 864 S.W.2d at 59-61.
368. 849 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993), overruled on other grounds by, 868
S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1994).
369. 849 S.W.2d at 837-38.
370. 866 S.W.2d at 269.
371. Id.
372. TEX. R. App. P. 50(d).
373. 853 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.- Waco 1993, writ denied).
374. Id. at 841.
375. Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1993); TEX. R. Civ. P. 243.
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Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne376 by making jury
charge preservation of error less complex, but the area is still fraught with
ambiguity and inconsistency. 377 The court's appointment of a special task
force to address the problems may offer much-needed reforms and allow the
court to effectuate the policy of resolving appeals on their merits rather than
on their technicalities. The decisions of the Survey period show a distinct
tendency to move in that direction.
376. 838 S.W.2d at 235.
377. See Spencer, 860 S.W.2d 868.
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